“Quo vadis?": What could be the post-war future of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church?

The war in Ukraine is coming to an end. The disappointing results and painful concessions that the state will have to make in the context of a future peace agreement will cast a shadow over the entire Ukrainian society, which, of course, will not pass the Ukrainian Orthodox Church by. Society will face a long period of sobering up and a series of disappointments. At this time, the Church should be the refuge where every war-weary heart could find the desired peace. However, it is worth recognizing that the UOC itself is at a crossroads today, and postwar realities may shake its internal stability even more. We will try to predict several scenarios for the future of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church after the war.

The UOC and geopolitics

From the very beginning of the war, it was clear that the Ukrainian government would use the church issue as a bargaining chip in future peace agreements. Sooner or later, every war ends in negotiations, and it is quite obvious that the Church is one of the “trump cards” or elements of influence in this matter. Historically, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has been and remains in Russia’s sphere of interest, as repeatedly stated by representatives of the Russian Federation at the highest level. This was absolutely obvious in the unfortunate year of 2022, when the Russian invasion took place, and even earlier in 2019, when Zelenskyy initiated his anti-church campaign.

Unfortunately, the conditions of existence that the Ukrainian government has set for the UOC have not left the Church with the possibility of independent resistance. Unprecedented legislative pressure, an atmosphere of fear of repression and imprisonment, and other elements of influence have silenced even the most eloquent. The UOC speakers who used to fill the information space with commentary on church-state relations are now either in prison or under threat of imprisonment.

The unenviable fate of Metropolitan Arseny of Sviatohirsk, as well as Metropolitans Jonathan, Pavel, Longinus, and Theodosius, apparently discouraged the rest of the episcopate from “fighting” the government’s repressive machine. As you know, the Church is not supposed to be bold enough to form its own information agenda without the bishop or at least his blessing. Especially at a time when ordinary priests and laity are being judged even for comments on social media.

In this regard, it becomes obvious that the UOC, being an object of geopolitics, can only wait to see what exactly it will be exchanged for in the context of future peace agreements. No matter how ironic it may seem, the Church in this case completely repeats the fate of the state. The United States and Russia, apparently, are still deciding on the end of the war in Ukraine without Ukraine, and the UOC, in this case, is going to be part of the package. That is, they will also decide on the UOC without the UOC. Both the country and the Church will simply be confronted with the fact, notifying them of the decisions made.

However, based on recent statements by the parties to the negotiation process, both are interested in keeping Ukraine on the world map. Accordingly, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church will be preserved. However, as in the case of the state, the future status of the UOC is unclear. Moreover, given the internal contradictions within the Church itself, a variety of interpretations may arise.

Between Istanbul and Moscow

The war in Ukraine has led to a new world order. The monolithic pedestal of Western hegemony has been shaken since Donald Trump came to power in the United States, who demonstrates an unwillingness to carry a relaxed European Union on the shoulders of the American taxpayer. Russia, for its part, is allegedly trying to get out from under China’s growing influence, which was ensured, in part, by Western sanctions. Unlike the secular world, the church oikoumena continues to live according to the old scheme, dividing into conventional Hellenes and barbarians. While the former are represented by the Patriarchate of Constantinople, the latter are the Russian Church and all those who have joined it.

When he created the OCU in 2018, Patriarch Bartholomew obviously hoped that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church would join this project. The UOC had a tempting argument: if the Church participated in the so-called unification council in full, the advantage in the voting would be obvious, and, in fact, it would be the UOC that would join everyone else, and not vice versa. However, the “rebranding trap” from the Patriarch of Constantinople did not work, and as time has shown, the absence of the overwhelming majority of the UOC at the “unification council” has justified itself. Otherwise, the “unified church” would have been bogged down in the struggle of the UOC with all the marginalized elements that came from the former UAOC and UOC-KP and “revealed” themselves as part of the OCU.

Despite this, the Phanar is firmly convinced that Ukraine already has an autocephalous church, the OCU, so no alternative associations will be created for those from the UOC who want to sit on two chairs – canonical and autocephalous. Yes, somewhere in academic circles there are still timid calls to create an exarchate for the UOC, which will then lead to a merger with the OCU, but this topic is more theoretical than practical. The situation is unlikely to change even after the new geopolitical boundaries are finally established. Notably, the Russian Orthodox Church is generally satisfied with this situation. During this time, the Russian Orthodox Church has clearly outlined its canonical boundaries and managed to convince most of the Local Churches that what happened in Ukraine in 2018 cannot be interpreted as anything other than Constantinople’s invasion of foreign territory.

The absence of Eucharistic communion between Moscow and Phanar, although painful, is not the final argument that could encourage the Patriarchate of Constantinople to cancel its claims to Ukraine. And even more so, given the tacit agreement of the majority of Local Churches with the position of the Russian Orthodox Church on the Ukrainian church issue, the Russian Church has no reason to rush to give up its canonical territory. Patriarch Kirill said: “We will never give up on Ukraine.” And, obviously, this position was heard by the Primates of other Churches, who do not want to break relations with the ROC for the sake of vague prospects from friendship with Phanar.

By and large, the refusal to recognize the OCU and, at the same time, the unwillingness to criticize Phanar, allows other Local Churches to remain independent in their foreign policy without tying themselves to any of the parties to the conflict. In this situation, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church serves as a kind of lightning rod, against which it is possible to determine who exactly they prefer in the current situation, without naming an obvious favorite.

Given this balance of power, it is extremely difficult to predict when the Ukrainian church crisis will be resolved. The fact that the recognition of the OCU has stopped is absolutely obvious. However, as long as Patriarch Bartholomew remains the Primate of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, it is unlikely that the Phanar’s attitude to this issue will change. Thus, even with changes in geopolitics, it is unlikely that Phanar will agree to convene a new Pan-Orthodox Council to resolve the issue of the OCU. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the Patriarchate of Constantinople is increasing its contradictions with the Russian Orthodox Church in the Baltics and, in general, wherever possible.

For the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the issue of the OCU can be resolved in the short term only if state pressure on the Church itself is weakened and internal contradictions within Dumenko’s structure increase. Fortunately for the UOC, the OCU is extremely successful in destroying itself from within. The lack of state support will significantly intensify the conflicts existing within the OCU between the key functionaries of this organization. However, this will take time. In addition, the stability of the UOC itself will directly depend on how Russia and the United States will agree on the humanitarian policy of post-war Ukraine.

The UOC and the ROC: the unsaid

First of all, it is necessary to accept the fact that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is not autocephalous and canonically dependent on the Russian Orthodox Church. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has naturally exposed the nerve of church relations between the Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches. The political overtones of the conflict inevitably affected the perception of the ROC within the UOC, and pressure from the authorities, the media, and some parts of society led to the convening of the UOC Council in Feofaniya in 2022. The resolutions adopted at the Council were an extreme measure that provoked a restrained but still negative reaction in the Russian Church. The Russian Orthodox Church made it clear that after the war we will have a “debriefing”.

As in the political space, there are conditional “hawks” in the church information space who demand that after the war even the status that the UOC currently has be taken away from it, returning it either to the form of an Exarchate or completely subordinating it to the Moscow Patriarchate without any privileges. The “doves” look at this issue somewhat frivolously, offering to solve everything in the simplest way – to grant autocephaly to the UOC. However, in our opinion, neither will be satisfied.

Let’s start with the “doves”. The position of the Russian Orthodox Church on the issue of autocephaly for the UOC has been repeatedly voiced by both Patriarch Kirill and other speakers of the Moscow Patriarchate. All the rhetoric of Russian Church officials indicates that full independence of the UOC is not expected in the near future. In addition, the ROC itself often makes a quite fair comment: “No one has asked us about this.” And it is true. The UOC, both now and after the war, is unlikely to be ready to unanimously appeal to the Moscow Patriarchate for autocephaly. There are many reasons for this, including the personal position of a significant part of the UOC bishops.

There is, of course, a certain pathogen in the form of about a thousand UOC clergymen who are committed to this idea. However, such a number, against the background of the total number of priests of the UOC, rather marginalizes the movement itself than gives any prospects for its realization. Moreover, in recent years, supporters of this idea have demonstrated their unreliability, often moving to the OCU or organizing acts of disobedience. So far, due to the desire of certain forces to undermine the UOC from within, they have enjoyed the protection of the authorities and are not subject to church sanctions. However, as soon as this immunity is lost, the layer of reactionary clergy in the UOC will outlive itself.

Accordingly, if the Russian Orthodox Church is not interested in the autocephaly of the UOC, and the UOC itself is not a candidate for this status, such an idea is unlikely to be realized in the near future. At the same time, if Ukraine’s statehood is preserved and the OCU is further self-destructed, this issue will inevitably arise – sooner or later.

As for the position of the church hawks, everything is more complicated. In their opinion, the ROC tolerates the excessive independence of the UOC, which has increased as a result of the Council in Feofaniya. The natural reaction of the ROC, as they see it, will be the decision of the “post-war” Council of the ROC, which will “anathematize” the Council in Feofaniya, all those involved will be punished, and the UOC will completely lose the status of independence and autonomy prescribed in the Letter of Patriarch Alexy. The “hawks” disagree on only one point: whether the UOC will be left in the status of an exarchate or fully integrated into the ROC.

It should be noted that the idea of integrating the UOC into the ROC is voiced against the backdrop of the successful implementation of such a scenario in the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia. As you know, the dioceses of the UOC in Crimea, Donbas, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions became part of the ROC, which caused approval on the Russian side and outrage on the Ukrainian side. Unofficially, the UOC called the event “expansion,” while officially these dioceses are still considered Ukrainian, as evidenced by publications in periodicals. In other words, the UOC believes that these dioceses were integrated into the ROC with violations of statutory procedures, although it does not publicly state this.

It seems to us that this issue will be the subject of mutual compromise between the Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches. The Russian Orthodox Church is well aware that the integration of the “independent and self-governing” UOC into its dioceses may be legally challenged, just as the decision of the Council in Feofaniya on the provision of the Holy Communion or the right to organize parishes abroad. Another thing is that both the first and the second happened exclusively in the context of war, and not “from a good life.” Objectively, the Russian Orthodox Church could not have provided the Ukrainian Church with peace during the three years of war. Also objectively, the UOC can neither physically nor actually influence what is happening in the dioceses that are now in the territories controlled by Russia.

In this regard, these topics may well become mutually reinforcing. That is, the Russian Orthodox Church will accept the expansion of the canonical powers of the UOC, and the UOC will give up its claims to some of its eastern Ukrainian dioceses. At the same time, the status quo will be preserved, in which the UOC remains “independent and autonomous” but canonically subordinate to the Russian Orthodox Church. It is also worth recognizing that the current mood within the UOC toward the ROC still indicates that the process of conditional warming will be very long. The ROC also understands this, so no one will cut them off. This is not beneficial to the Moscow Patriarchate because any sudden movement may still push part of the UOC into the arms of Phanar, which is only waiting for this.

Both political and ecclesiastical

Thus, the postwar future of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church will directly depend on political and ecclesiastical factors. From a political point of view, the UOC needs to get the anti-church law No. 3894 repealed in order not to lose its legal status within the country. This issue seems to have a common understanding in both Russia and the United States. Russia will raise it during the negotiations for obvious reasons, and the United States will raise it because of the change in domestic policy on this issue and Donald Trump’s messianic course. The new Ukrainian government’s refusal to repress the UOC will make the Church freer in its development, which will ultimately affect the welfare of the OCU, as its main opponent.

As for the church factor, there is no doubt that subtle church diplomacy will not allow for the formation of another center of tension within the structure of the Russian Orthodox Church, given the fact that similar problems to Ukraine are clearly foreseen in the Baltic States and Moldova. In addition, after the war, the Phanar’s claims to Ukraine will not disappear, and therefore the Ukrainian Orthodox Church will remain an outpost limiting the expansion of the “Hellenic world” into the canonical territory of the ROC.